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Abstract. Legal historians have observed that many legal norms have remained in force 
for a long time; yet the great degree of social change would prima facie also entail legal 
innovations. But there have been fewer than expected. Can one construct a general theoretical 
framework for assessing explanations concerning legal change and legal stability? Further, can 
such a framework be constructed from the perspective of comparative law? It may perhaps 
be argued that comparative law is not sufficient for constructing such a theory; a general 
analysis of society is also needed. But even if concrete conditions, and cause and effect 
relations cannot be entirely explained by an abstract scheme, it is at least reasonable to 
hope that such a scheme may clarify some of the basic concepts at work and enhance 
insights into the nature and progress of law. The first part of this paper considers the 
nature and scope of comparative law and identifies different approaches to the subject 
adopted by contemporary comparatists. In the second part, the problem of legal change 
is discussed from the standpoint of a particular theoretical perspective represented by 
Professor Alan Watson, one of the most productive post-War comparatists and legal 
historians.  
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Defining the scope of comparative law  
  
Theories on the nature and development of law can only gain universal validity 
if they are capable of encompassing many (if not all) systems of law and, in 
turn, this suggests the prerequisite for a detailed study of at least a range of 
legal systems. The knowledge jurists depend on when aspiring to devise tools 
for a proper understanding and construction of legal phenomena cannot be 
gained by an examination of a single legal system, since law transcends national 
boundaries, or without a comparison. Like legal history, legal sociology and 
legal philosophy, comparative law provides jurists with additional perspectives 
for a more complete understanding of law and, by enriching their intellectual 
repertory, enables them to better accomplish their tasks. It introduces concepts, 
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sty les, organizations and categorizations previously unknown, revealing 
unsuspected possibilities in the very notion of law and thus enabling jurists to 
more effectively address the legal, social and political issues that legal systems 
strive to resolve. 
 Modern comparative law has progressed through different stages of evolution. 
Influenced by developments in the biological sciences, linguistics and new 
theories of social evolution during the nineteenth century, comparatists tended 
to focus, at that time, upon the historical development of legal systems with a 
view to tracing broad patterns of legal development common to all societies. 
The idea of the organic evolution of law as a social phenomenon led jurists 
to search for basic structures, or a ‘morphology’, of law and other social 
institutions. They sought and constructed evolutionary patterns with a view to 
uncovering the essence of the ‘idea of law’.1 Of particular importance to the 
development of comparative and historical jurisprudence was Sir Henry Maine’s 
work on the laws of ancient peoples. According to Maine, while comparative 
law, as opposed to the properly so-called jurisprudence, is concerned with 
the analysis of law at a certain point of time, historical-comparative juris-
prudence focuses on the idea of legal development or the dynamics of law. But 
it was F. Pollock, Maine’s disciple and successor in his scientific endeavours, 
who synthesized science and comparative law by drawing attention to the 
connection or interrelationship between the ‘static’ point of view of comparative 
law in a narrow sense and the ‘dynamic’ approach of historical jurisprudence. To 
him, jurisprudence itself must be both historical and comparative; in this respect, 
comparative law plays more than a merely secondary or supporting role, it has a 
distinct place in the system of legal sciences.2 The position adopted at the First 
  
 1 According to Franz Bernhöft, ‘[C]omparative law wants to teach how peoples of 
common heritage elaborate the inherited legal notions for themselves, how one people 
receives institutions from another one and modifies them according to their own views, and 
finally how legal systems of different nations evolve even without any factual interconnec-
tion according to the common laws of evolution. It searches, in a nut-shell, within the 
systems of law, the idea of law’. Ueber Zweck und Mittel der vergleichenden Rechts-
wissenschaft, 1.  
 2 As Pollock remarked, “It makes no great difference whether we speak of historical 
jurisprudence or comparative jurisprudence, or, as the Germans seem inclined to do, of the 
general history of law.” Pollock, F.: The History of Comparative Jurisprudence. Journal of 
the Society of Comparative Legislation 5 (1903) 74 at 76. The influence of t his school of 
though is reflected in more recent discussions of the nature and aims of the comparative 
study of laws. Thus, according to Rotondi, comparison is one of two methods (the other 
being the historical method) whose combination can give us a comprehensive knowledge 
of law as a universal social phenomenon. Legal science relies upon these methods in order 
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International Congress of Comparative Law, held in Paris in 1900, as to the 
nature and objectives of comparative law stressed both the independence of 
comparative law from other fields of scientific inquiry, and its long-term 
practical goal, namely the unification of the laws of peoples at similar stages of 
cultural and economic development through the elimination of the accidental 
differences between them. At that Congress, the famous French comparatist 
Raymond Saleilles asserted that the chief aim of comparative law is the discovery, 
through the study of different national laws, of concepts and principles common 
to all ‘civilized’ legal systems, i.e. universal concepts and principles that 
constitute a relatively ideal law–a kind of natural law with a changeable 
character.3 According to Édouard Lambert, a unity of general purpose can be 
detected in similar legislation from different states, in spite of the absence of 
such unity at the level of the rules embodied in the legislation. It is thus 
possible to discern a common basis of legal solutions and establish a ‘common 
legislative law’. The unitary and universalistic mentality underpinning the 
approach to comparative law adopted in the Paris Congress reflects the 
influence of schools of thought that dominated European legal science in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. One of these schools was the German 
Begriffsjurisprudenz (jurisprudence of concepts). Favouring the construction of 
grand schemes of systematization, Bergriffsjurisprudenz placed strong emphasis 
on the formulation of abstract, logically interconnected, conceptual categories 
                                                      
to detect and construe the (natural) laws governing the evolution of this phenomenon. In 
searching for relations between different legal systems, or families of legal systems, one 
seeks to discover, to the extent that this is possible, certain stable features in this evolutionary 
process that may allow one to foreshadow future developments concerning the character 
and orientation of legal systems and branches of law. Technique du droit dogmatique et 
droit compare. Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé (1968) 13. And see Herzog: Les 
principes et les methods du droit pénal comparé. Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé 
(1957) 350. And according to Yntema, comparative law, following the tradition of the ius 
commune (droit commun), as an expression of the deep-rooted humanist vision 
concerning the universality of justice, and based on the study of historical phenomena, 
seeks to discover and construe in a rational way (en termes rationnels) the common 
elements of human experience relating to law and justice. In the world today the primary 
task of comparative law is to elucidate the conditions under which economic and 
technological development can take place within the framework of the Rule of Law. Le 
droit comparé et l’ humanisme. Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé (1958) 698.  
 3 Conception et objet de la science juridique du droit compare. In: Procès verbaux des 
séances et documents du Congrès international de droit comparé 1900, 1905–1907, I, 167 
at 173. 
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as a means of constructing highly systematic bodies of positive law.4 By 
comparing conceptual forms the members of this school hoped to find concrete 
evidence of general, universally valid, legal systematics, and to reveal the 
common core or essence of basic juridical concepts, even if it was admitted 
that every legal order has a system of its own.  
 The works of nineteenth century scholars, which endeavoured to concep-
tualize legal phenomena on a historical-comparative plane, paved the way for 
the recognition of comparative law as a science and an academic discipline. 
During the twentieth century, however, many comparative law scholars, most 
notably Gutteridge and David, adopted the view that comparative law was no 
more than a method to be employed for diverse purposes in the study of law. 
According to this view, comparative law is no more than a means to an end and 
therefore the purposes for which the comparative method would be utilized 
should provide the basis for any definition of comparative law as a subject. This 
approach entailed a shift in emphasis from comparative law as a science to the 
uses of the comparative method in the study of law. By focusing on the uses, 
aims or purposes of comparative study, comparatists divided their activities 
into categories such as ‘descriptive comparative law’ or ‘comparative nomos-
copy’, signifying the mere description of foreign law; ‘applied comparative law’ 
or ‘comparative legislation’, referring to the use of foreign law for the purpose 
of reforming one’s own legal system; ‘comparative nomothetics’, concerned 
with the evaluation of foreign law; ‘comparative nomogenetics’ or ‘comparative 
history of law’, focusing on the evolution of legal norms and institutions; and 
‘abstract or speculative comparative law’ or ‘comparative jurisprudence’, with 
respect to which the comparative method was designed to assist sociologists 
and legal philosophers.5 However, the above divisions do not militate against 
the basic unity of comparative law as a scientific method. As Gutteridge points 
out, comparative law is not made up of a variety of independent inquiries 
related to each other only by virtue of the fact that they all involve the study of 
different legal systems. The basic feature of comparative law, as a method, is 
that it can be applied to all types and fields of legal inquiry.6  
 In general, a distinction may be drawn between three types of comparative 
legal inquiry: idealistic, realistic and particularistic. From the idealistic view-
point, legal order is seen as a normative matter that is present in the factual legal 
  
 4 See e.g., Puchta, G. F.: Cursus der Institutionen. I, 1841. esp. 95–108; Windscheid: 
Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts. 1891. I. 59–60.  
 5 See in general, Gutteridge, H. C.: Le droit compare. Paris, 1953. 20.  
 6 Ibid. at 28. And see Langrod, G.: Quelques réflexions méthodologiques sur la 
comparaison en science juridique. Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé (1957) 363. 
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order although it cannot be identified with it. The realistic perspective, on the 
other hand, is based upon an empirical view of legal order. Both the idealistic 
and realistic approaches are concerned with the problem of generalization. The 
study of legal orders brings to light innumerable differences and similarities. 
Idealistic universalism seeks to discover the ideal of law, which is present in 
all legal orders; realistic universalism seeks to reveal the sociological laws 
governing legal phenomena. In spite of their theoretical juxtaposition, both 
approaches have universalism in common: they are not content with a mere 
description as they want to systematize, to find out general means of explanation 
to account for legal phenomena irrespective of time and place. Those who 
follow a particularistic approach to comparative law, by contrast, claim that 
general schemes are too abstract to serve as goals of study. This approach, 
quite common in the contemporary practice of comparative law, tends to 
reduce comparative law to a detailed description of different legal orders. 
From this point of view, comparison is only a translation of valid legal orders 
into one language. In most cases, however, some kind of intermediate position 
between universalism and particularism is sought, as far as it is recognized that 
there are both general and particular features in every legal order.7 It might be 
said that the universal and individual features of legal phenomena are different 
aspects of a uniform whole, although both aspects are in order to grasp reality. 
The more general a description is, the more phenomena of concrete life it covers, 
and the better it is as a scientific description, but the less does it represent a 
particular form of life. The exact course of historical events is always individual 
and can be explained only by reference to its particular elements; but the broad 
outline of the events is subject to general socio-historical laws. Even though 
legal sociology might strive towards a universalist knowledge of law, as does 
legal philosophy in a different sense, comparative law is by its own nature 
forever bound to vacillate between the general and the particular. The 
comparative process may be described as dialectical, since it focuses upon the 
inter-connection between general principles and concrete observations made 
when these principles are applied in practice. Thus, the general explanatory 
background is concretized in particular cases; at the same time, a general 
historical outlook enables one to make certain generalizations from particular 
events within the framework of a general model of explanation.  
 The role of comparative analyses in the field of legal history deserves 
special attention. The history of law explores the sources of legal phenomena, 
and the evolution of legal systems and individual legal institutions in different 
  
 7 This reflects the Aristotelian view of legal order as a result partly of natural 
regularities and laws, and partly of human will. 
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historical contexts. It is concerned both with the history of a single legal order 
and the legal history of many societies, the universal history of law. By 
comparing different legal systems at different stages of development, legal 
historians attempt to trace the evolution of legal institutions and the historical 
ties that may exist between legal systems. Historical analyses of law utilizing 
the comparative method are essential for understanding the development of 
legal systems. Without the knowledge derived from historical-comparative 
legal studies it is impossible to investigate contemporary legal institutions, as 
these are to a great extent the products of historical conditions, borrowings and 
mutual influences of legal systems in the past.  
 Legal historians have observed that many legal norms have remained in 
force for a long time; yet the great degree of social change would prima facie 
also entail legal innovations. But there have been fewer than expected. How 
can the relative longevity of law be explained? One might say that there are 
social structures that have remained largely unchanged and that, accordingly, 
should be used to explain the longevity of some legal norms or institutions. But 
an obscure reference to some structure carries little weight as an explanation. The 
question is: can on e construct a general theoretical framework for assessing 
explanations concerning legal change and legal stability? Further, can such a 
framework be constructed from the perspective of comparative law? It may 
perhaps be argued that comparative law is not sufficient for constructing 
such a theory; a general analysis of society is needed. But even if concrete 
conditions, and cause and effect relations cannot be entirely explained by an 
abstract scheme, such a scheme may clarify some of the basic concepts at work 
and enhance insights into the nature and progress of law.   
 The following paragraphs consider the questions of legal change and legal 
stability from the viewpoint of comparative law. The discussion will focus on 
aspects of the legal change theory developed by Professor Alan Watson, one of 
the most productive post-War comparatists and legal historians. 
 
 
A comparative theory of legal change?  
 
Since the publication of the first edition of his seminal book, Legal Trans-
plants: An Approach to Comparative Law in 1974, Watson has produced many 
works on the relationship between law and society, and the factors accounting 
for legal change.8 In these works he iterates his belief that changes in a legal 
  
 8 See, e.g., Watson, A.: Aspects of Reception of Law. American Journal of 
Comparative Law 44 (1996) 335; Comparative Law and Legal Change. Cambridge Law 
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system are due to legal transplants: the transfer of legal rules and institutions 
from one legal system to another. ‘Legal transplanting’ involves a legal system 
incorporating a legal rule, institution or doctrine adopted from another legal 
system. It may also pertain to the reception of an entire legal system, which may 
occur in a centralist way, as displayed by the introduction of the Napoleonic 
Code in many European countries. However, in most cases foreign rules or 
doctrines are ‘borrowed’ in the context of legal practice itself, because they fill 
a gap or meet a particular need in the importing country. Until the nineteenth 
century legal transplanting mainly occurred within Europe. In the course of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries European laws were transplanted in 
many countries around the world either directly or through the adoption of 
European codes. During the same period, English Common law spread through 
the colonies of the British Empire in North America, Australia, New Zealand 
and parts of Asia and Africa. In the past few decades, many institutions of 
Anglo-American law have been adopted by countries of Continental Europe.9 
Legal transplanting is also associated with the so-called ‘hybrid’ legal systems, 
i.e. systems whose development was influenced by two or more legal traditions.10 
To understand the reception of foreign law phenomenon one must examine the 
reasons behind the introduction of foreign law in a particular case (e.g. whether 
it is the result of conquest, colonial expansion or the political influence of the 
state whose law is adopted,11 or it pertains to the perceived quality and prestige 
                                                      
Journal (1978) 313; Legal Transplants and Law Reform. Law Quarterly Review (1976) 92; 
Society and Legal Change, Philadelphia, 1977; Sources of Law, Legal Change, and 
Ambiguity. Philadelphia, 1984; Legal Origins and Legal Change. London, 1991; The 
Evolution of Western Private Law. Baltimore, 2001. And see R. Sacco: Legal Formants: A 
Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law. American Journal of Comparative Law (1991). 
 9 An example is the concept of ‘trust’, originally an Anglo-American legal concept, 
which has been adopted by many Continental European legal systems. 
 10 Such as, for example, South Africa (Roman-Dutch and English influence), Québec 
(French and English influence) and Louisiana (French and American influence).  
 11 Territorial expansion through military conquest (such as the Roman expansion in the 
Mediterranean world; the settlement of Germanic peoples in Europe; the expansion of 
Islam in Africa and Asia; and the Spanish conquests in Central and South America) did not 
always entail the imposition of the conquering peoples’ laws on the subjugated populations 
(for example, in lands under Germanic and Islamic rule subject populations continued to be 
governed by their own systems of law under the so-called ‘principle of the personality of 
law’). In some cases a direct imposition did in fact occur (consider, for example, the 
introduction of Spanish law in South America), while in others the law of the conquering 
nation was introduced in part or in an indirect fashion (for example, during the British and 
French colonial expansion there was a tendency to introduce into the colonies elements of 
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of the adopted law).12 This analysis must also address the roles that legal 
science, legal education and the legal profession play in the reception process; 
the form of the imported law (whether it is a written, customary or judge-made 
law); and whether (or to what extent) the importing and exporting countries are 
compatible with respect to culture, socio-economic structure and level of 
development, as well as the outcomes of legal transplanting. 
 The destinies of legal transplants in different cultural, socio-economic and 
political contexts are important to examine for determining the desirability and 
applicability of such transplants for legislative and judicial practice. It may be 
true that ethno-cultural, political and socio-economic differences between the 
exporting and the importing countries do not preclude the successful trans-
plantation of legal rules and institutions. Legal rules can be taken out of context 
and can serve as a model for legal development in a very different society. 
However, one should keep in mind that an imported legal norm is occasionally 
ascribed a different, local meaning, when it is rapidly indigenized on account 
of the host culture’s inherent integrative capacity. It is not surprising that, very 
often, European legal concepts, institutions and rules imported by non-Western 
countries are understood in a way that is different from that in the donor 
countries. The absence of substantial differences in the wording of a statute 
law from the donor and the host countries does not imply that legal reality, or 
everyday legal and social practice in the two countries, should be identical or 
similar. The legal reality in the host country may be very different with respect 
to the way people (including judges and state officials) read, interpret and 
justify the relevant law and the court decisions based on it. Moreover, the role 
of statute law in the recipient country may be much weaker than it is in the 
exporting country and custom may be a predominant factor. Thus, in practice, 
social rules might effectively prevent people from initiating a legal claim or 
even using a court decision supporting such a claim. As this suggests, it is not 
good sense to use the perspective and framework of one’s own legal culture 
when examining a law or legal concept in a legal system operating within the 
context of another culture. Such an approach carries the risk of implying the 
                                                      
the legal systems of the colonial powers or to develop systems of law adapted to local 
circumstances but largely reflecting the character of the metropolitan systems). 
 12 Consider, for example, the reception of Roman law in Continental Europe. Many 
centuries after the demise of the Roman state, the jurists of Western Europe came to regard 
Roman law as intellectually superior to other systems of law. Seen as constituting an 
expression of natural reason, Roman law was received in Europe not by virtue of any 
theory concerning its continued validity as part of the positive law, but in consequence of 
its own inherent worth. In other words, its validity was accepted not ratione auctoritatis, 
but auctoritate rationis.  
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existence of many more similarities than there actually are.13 It would be 
impossible to understand the very idea of Western legal tradition without 
recognizing the enormous variety of legal norms and styles that are common 
within it, not only within the Civil law and the Common law domains, but also 
across the borders of these legal families.  
 According to Watson, the nomadic character or rules proves that the idea of 
a close relationship between law and society is a fallacy.14 Law is largely 
autonomous and develops by transplantation, not because some rule was the 
inevitable consequence of the social structure, but because those who control 
law-making were aware of the foreign rule and recognised the apparent 
benefits that could derive from it.15 Watson does not contemplate that rules are 
borrowed without alteration or modification; rather, he indicates that voluntary 
transplants would nearly always–always in the case of a major transplant–
involve a change in the law largely unconnected with particular factors operating 
within society.16 Neither does Watson expect that a rule, once transplanted, will 
operate in exactly the same way it did in the country of its origin. Against this 
  
 13 As Watson has remarked, “except where the systems are closely related, the differences 
in legal values may be so extreme as to render virtually meaningless the discovery that 
systems have the same or a different rule”. Legal Transplants, 5. For example, consider the 
difficulties surrounding the interpretation of the concept of individual freedom, as found in 
international treaties on human rights. Individual freedom has a rather different meaning in 
China and other Asian countries, as compared to the Western view, not just because of a 
political ideology currently or formerly imposed by the rulers of those countries, but 
because of a more basic, culturally embedded ideology that originates from a very different, 
collectivist world view. For an elaboration of the theory of legal transplants see Ewald, W.: 
Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants. American Journal of 
Comparative Law 43 (1995) 489.  
 14 Legal Transplants, 2nd ed. 1993. 108. On the view that law is the result of the social 
needs of a given society see in general Friedmann, W.: Law in Changing Society. 1959; 
Damaska, M.: The Faces of Justice and State Authority 1986; Friedman, L. M.: A History 
of American Law 18 (1973) 595.  
 15 Watson, A.: Comparative Law and Legal Change. Cambridge Law Journal 37 (1978) 
313, 313–315 and 32.  
 16 Watson has identified a number of factors that determine which rules will be borrowed, 
including: (a) accessibility (this pertains to the question of whether the rule is in writing, in 
a form that is easily found and understood, and readily available); (b) habit (once a system 
is used as a quarry, it will be borrowed from again, and the more it is borrowed from, the 
more the right thing to do is to borrow from that system, even when the rule that is taken is 
not necessarily appropriate; (c) chance (e.g., a particular written source may be present in a 
particular library at a particular time, or lawyers from one country may train in, and 
become familiar with the law of another country); and (d) the authority and the prestige of 
the legal system from which rules are borrowed. 
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background, Watson argues that comparative law, construed as a distinct 
intellectual discipline, should be concerned with the study of the historical 
relationships between legal orders and the destinies of legal transplants in 
different countries.17 On this basis one may identify the factors explaining the 
change or immutability of law.18 Watson asserts that comparative law (which 
he distinguishes from knowledge of foreign law) can enable those engaged in 
law reform to better understand their historical role and tasks. It can provide 
them with a clearer perspective as to whether and to what extent it is 
reasonable to appropriate from other systems and which systems to select; and 
whether it is possible to accept foreign legal rules and institutions with or 
without modifications.19  
 Watson attempts to construct a comprehensive theory of legal change from 
ancient times to the modern era. He has the requisite qualifications: he is a 
distinguished Romanist. An important part of his work is concerned with the 
worldwide reception of Roman law and its admirable longevity as a system 
under different socio-economic conditions. The Roman law, as shaped by the 
compilers of the Justinianic codification in the sixth century AD, has been one 
of the strongest forces in the development of Western law. Although Justinian 
sought to produce, on the basis of the legal inheritance of the past, an authori-
tative statement of contemporary law, his system was adopted and applied by 
most European countries during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance; in wide 
  
 17 Legal Transplants, 6.  
 18 Legal Transplants, 21. To illustrate this, Watson mentions a set of rules concerned 
with matrimonial property, which traveled “from the Visigoths to become the law of the 
Iberian Peninsula in general, migrating then from Spain to California, [and] from California 
to other states in the western United States”. Ibid. at 108. He adds, that if one considers a 
range of legal systems over a long term “the picture that emerge[s] is of continual massive 
borrowing … of rules”. Ibid. at 107. On this basis he concludes that the moving of a rule or a 
system of law from one country to another has now been shown to be the most fertile 
source of legal development, since “most changes in most systems are the result of 
borrowing”. Ibid. at 94. Watson’s theory of legal transplants has been challenged by some 
scholars. See e.g. Legrand, P.: The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants”. Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law 4 (1997) 111; What ‘Legal Transplant’? In: 
Nelken, D.–Feest, J. (eds): Adapting Legal Cultures. Oxford, 2001. 55; Wise, E. M.: The 
Transplant of Legal Patterns. American Journal of Comparative Law, 1990. 1; Murdock, G. P.: 
How Culture Changes. In: Shapiro, H. (ed.): Man Culture and Society. Oxford, 1990, 256. 
Consider also Cotterrell, R.: Is there a Logic of Legal Transplants? In: Nelken–Feest (eds): 
op. cit. 71. 
 19 Despite the rather far-reaching nature of some of his statements, it is important to 
observe that Watson has generally confined his studies, and the deriving theory of legal 
change, to the development of private law in Western countries.  
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areas of Germany and other European regions it remained an immediate source 
of law until the end of the nineteenth century. Roman private law was used in 
Catholic, Calvinist and Lutheran countries; it operated in countries where 
agriculture dominated economic life and it also applied in mercantile centres 
and later in countries undergoing the industrialization process. This law, first 
adopted in Europe, was directly or indirectly (through a European law code) 
transplanted in South America, Quebec, Louisiana and many countries in 
Asia and Africa. But why was Roman law adopted? The medieval reception 
of Roman law was partly due to the lack of centralized governments and 
developed formal legal systems that could compete with the comprehensive 
inheritance of Rome; and partly due to the fact that the lands formerly governed 
by the Romans were accustomed to this style of thought, and accorded it 
wisdom and authority. A third feature, deriving almost completely from the 
model of the Corpus Iuris Civilis, was the desire of most countries to codify 
their law and the aspirations of later jurists to conform their studies to this 
model. But Roman law was not adopted merely because it was admired, nor 
because its norms were particularly suitable for the social conditions in the 
early European nation-states. In fact, many norms of Roman law were entirely 
antiquated. Foremost, it was the perceived superiority of Roman law as a system 
that led to the adoption of its norms, even if this adoption was supported by a 
learned tradition that endured for centuries. Juridical norms and their systematic 
organization are more perennial than most rules of current law. This is, of 
course, partly due to the existence of common problems, but also partly due to 
historical tradition, the fact that Roman law has been an important common 
denominator of most Western legal experience. Thus the conceptual system of 
Roman law may be said to be an apt tertium comparationis, as it constitutes a 
common basis of the legally organized relationships of life in the West.20  
 The experience of the legal historian underlies Watson’s scepticism towards 
the view that law is directly derived from social conditions. According to him, 
history shows that legal change in European private law has occurred mainly 
by transplantation of legal rules and is not necessarily due to the impact of 
social structures. He sees legal change as an essentially ‘internal’ process,21 in 
the sense that sociological influences on legal development are considered 
  
 20  Legal relationships are to a large extent organized by forms derived from Roman 
law. One might say that these forms constitute a kind of pre-knowledge for Western legal 
systems. 
 21 He speaks of an ‘internal legal logic’ or of ‘the internal logic of the legal tradition’ 
governing legal development. See Watson, A.: The Evolution of Law. Philadelphia, 1985, 
21–22. 
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generally unimportant. The evidence to support this position is derived from 
history, which Watson claims to show: that the transplanting of legal rules 
between systems is socially easy even when there are great material and 
cultural differences between the donor and recipient societies; that no area of 
private law is very resistance to change through foreign influence–contrary to 
the sociologically oriented argument that culturally rooted law is more difficult 
to change than merely instrumental law;22 and that the recipient legal systems 
require no knowledge of the context of origin and development of the laws 
received by transplantation from another system.23 Social, economic, and 
political factors affect the shape of the generated law only to the extent 
they are present in the consciousness of lawmakers, i.e. the group of lawyers 
and jurists who control the mechanisms of legal change. The lawmakers’ 
awareness of these factors may be heightened by pressure from other parts of 
society, but even then, the lawmakers’ response will be conditioned by the 
legal tradition: by their learning, expertise and knowledge of law, domestic and 
foreign. Societal pressure may engender a change in the law, but the resulting 
legal rule will usually be adopted from a system known to the lawmaker and 
often modified without always a full consideration of the local conditions. 
Watson stresses that law is, to a considerable extent, a phenomenon operating 
at the level of ideology; it is an autonomous discipline largely resistant to 
influences beyond the law itself. From this point of view, he argues that the 
law itself provides the impetus for change. At the same time, he recognizes 
that there is a necessary relationship between law and society, notwithstanding 
that a considerable disharmony tends to exist between the best rule that the 
society envisages for itself and the rule that it actually has. The task of legal 
theory with comparative law as the starting-point is to shed light on this 
relationship and, in particular, to elucidate the inconsistencies between the law 
actually in force and the ideal law, i.e. the law that would correspond to the 
demands of society or its dominant strata. As this suggests, Watson’s theory is 
basically idealistic.24 
  
 22 See on this Levy, E.: The Reception of Highly Developed Legal Systems by Peoples 
of Different Cultures. Washington Law Review 25 (1950) 233. 
 23 A. Watson: Legal Transplants and Law Reform. Law Quarterly Review 92 (1976) 
79, 80–81. 
 24 According to Watson, “It should  be obvious that law exists  and flourishes  at the 
level of idea, and is part of culture. As culture it operates in at least three spheres of 
differing size, one within another. … The spheres are: the population at large, lawyers and 
lawmakers. By ‘lawmakers’ I mean the members of that elite group who in a particular 
society have their hands on the levers of legal change, whether as legislators, judges, or 
jurists. … For a rule to become law it must be institutionalized.  It must go through the stages 
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 In an article published a few years after Legal Transplants, Watson 
delineated the factors that control the relationship between legal rules and the 
society in which they operate.25 Consideration of these factors is crucial to 
understanding the phenomenon of legal change. Whilst Watson admits that it is 
extremely difficult to determine the relative weight or impact of each factor, he 
specifies that their interaction should a priori be assessed as more important 
than the relative evaluation of the individual factors. In this respect, his model 
may be described as holistic. The factors are the following:  
 – Source of law 
 – Pressure force 
 – Opposition force 
 – Transplant bias 
 – Law-shaping lawyers 
 – Discretion factor 
 – Generality factor 
 – Inertia 
 – Felt needs 
 Watson recognizes that there may be some common elements in these 
factors. Indeed, it could even be maintained that some factors are only different 
aspects of the same problem, at least when applied to concrete contexts of 
legal change. This again is due to the inevitable interconnections between 
the matters considered. Even though on e might question whether Watson’s 
scheme is the optimal method for presenting a comparative theory of legal 
change, one cannot deny the relevance of the observations he presents under 
the heading of ‘factors’. Therefore, I shall proffer a short account of the factors 
and the way they operate.  
 According to Watson, the development of a legal system is influenced by 
the nature of the predominant source or sources of law, whether this is custom, 
statute, code, judicial precedent or juristic doctrine. Precedent-based law 
develops more slowly than statutory law because such law “must always wait 
upon events, and, at that, on litigated events”; “there is no way of defining 
precisely the ratio decidendi of a particular case”, for “only when there is a 
line of cases does it become possible to discover the principle underlying even 
                                                      
required for achieving the status of law. … Because lawyers and lawmakers are involved in 
all those processes a rule cannot become law without being subject to legal culture.” Legal 
Chance: Sources of Law and Legal Culture, University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1983) 
1121, 1152–1153. 
 25 Comparative Law and Legal Change. Cambridge Law Journal 37 (1978) 313–336. 
Although these factors pertain primarily to the Western legal tradition, Watson believes that 
they are valid also outside this sphere of legal culture. 
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the first case”.26 Thus, precedent-based law is always retrospective, whereas 
statutory law looks forward. While law based on precedent is slow to change, 
statutory law, which is more systematic and broader in scope, can be relied 
upon to introduce drastic and swift reforms. Moreover, development by statute 
with its more adequate theoretical basis can point the way to further reform. 
Watson also draws attention to the historical roots of the sources-of-law doctrine 
in different legal orders. It should be noted, however, that in many cases it is 
only legal change that determines the character of the sources-of-law doctrine 
and not vice versa. If social, economic, political or ideological change generates 
a need for revision of the law, the bonds with the sources of law (whether 
precedents or statutes) are loosened. Further, one should not over-emphasize 
the capacity of a statute-law system to foresee problems. If there is a ‘gap’ in 
written law, a court will often find it difficult to engage in the same sort of 
creative activity as its counterpart can in a seemingly ‘retrospective’ stare 
decisis system.  
 The term pressure force refers to the organized group or groups of persons 
who believe that they would derive a benefit from a practicable change in the 
law. Watson says that the power wielded by a group to effect legal change 
varies in accordance with the social and economic position of its members and 
its capacity to act on a particular source of law. Pressure forces of different 
constitutions have varying effects upon individual sources of law, and different 
sources respond to pressure in different ways. In general, development by 
legislation is more affected by pressure forces than development by precedent. 
Watson stresses the independence of judges in precedent-based systems. As 
judges are not elected and their role is not seen as primarily political, they 
cannot be subject to direct pressure by organized groups, nor can they easily be 
swayed by general policy issues. He adds that juristic doctrine, as a source of 
law, is also mainly immune from pressure forces, except where a pressure 
force has great power and authority (e.g., not only an established Church, or 
the ruling party in a totalitarian state can directly and indirectly influence juristic 
doctrine but the doctrine itself can gain strength because of its connection with 
the dominant ideology). I think that Watson over-emphasizes the immunity of 
judges and jurists from external pressure. He says, for example, that a jurist’s 
opinions would lose authority if a pressure force directly influenced him. But 
this pertains only to the pressure forces motivated by a newly-invented idea 
or need. Usually there is a system of permanent pressure forces in society, and 
most lawyers belong to that system. It is important to consider whether or to 
  
 26 Ibid. at 323. 
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what extent judges and jurists are susceptible to political arguments, and the 
degree of participation in politics they are permitted in different systems.  
 Opposition force is the converse of a pressure force and embodies the 
organized group or groups of persons who believe that harm will result from a 
proposed change in the law. For an opposition force to exist, it is required that 
the group that would be adversely affected by the change is adequately organized. 
Watson remarks that although the persons who will be adversely affected by a 
proposed change in the law may be more numerous than those who will 
benefit, the change will most likely be executed if the anticipated gains of each 
member within the latter group is extensive, whereas the perceived harm to 
each member of the former group is small. The absence of an organized 
opposition force in such a case explains why legislation that is overall harmful 
and generally considered unpopular is occasionally passed without much 
resistance.  
 Transplant bias harrsid is an essential element of Watson’s theory that 
legal change primarily occurs through the appropriation or imitation of norms. 
It refers to a system’s receptivity to a particular foreign law as a matter distinct 
from acceptance based on a thorough assessment of all possible alternatives.27 
This receptivity varies from system to system and its extent depends on factors 
such as the linguistic tradition shared with a potential donor system; the 
general prestige of the possible donor system; and the educational background 
and experience of the legal professionals in the recipient system. Watson also 
draws attention to the interaction of the factors determining legal development, 
pointing out that transplant bias interacts particularly with the sources of law. 
The adoption of an entire foreign legal code is probably the clearest manifes-
tation of transplant bias. Juristic doctrine is also very susceptible to foreign 
influence. This is evidenced by the fact that the reception of Roman law in 
Continental Europe first occurred in the field of legal science. Precedent, on 
the other hand, seems to be least affected by transplant bias. When judges 
borrow from foreign legal systems, the value of the foreign rule for the judge’s 
own system is often carefully considered and evaluated. In analyzing transplant 
bias one must bear in mind that, according to Watson, law develops principally 
through the adoption of rules and structures from elsewhere. The nature of this 
factor has an authoritative argument form such as: norm N is a Roman law 
norm–Roman law is superior–therefore, norm N should be accepted. Behind 
the minor premise of this inference there is no general appraisal of all norms of 
Roman law, but rather an opinion based upon the systematical coherence of 
  
 27 Transplant bias may be used to denote, for example, a system’s readiness to accept a 
Roman law norm because the norm is derived from Roman law. 
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the relevant norm. The assertion, ‘Roman law is superior’, is neither deductive 
(i.e. based upon an axiom concerning the superiority of Roman law) nor inductive 
(where one should present reasons for considering the particular norm N good); 
rather it is quasi-inductive and systematical.  
  Law-shaping lawyers are the legal elite that shape the law and whose 
knowledge, imagination, training and experience of the world and legal ideas 
strongly influence the end product of any change in the law. Watson notes that 
lawyers are well-placed to act as pressure or opposition forces. Their knowledge 
of how the legal system actually works means that they are fully aware of 
how the current law or its change affects their well-being. Besides this, legal 
professionals mould the law, in developed legal systems at least, in many ways: 
as members of parliamentary or governmental committees they are directly 
involved in the drafting of legislation; as judges they determine the shape and 
form of judicial precedents; and as jurists they contribute to the development 
of juristic doctrine and its recognition as a source of law. Watson observes 
that law-shaping lawyers are a factor one could remove as their functions are 
adequately covered by the notions of source of law and transplant bias, but they 
contribute such a particular flavour that their role deserves specific attention. 
In his more recent work, however, Watson places greater emphasis on the role 
of legal culture in shaping law’s internal development.28 According to him, 
legal culture pertains to the general outlook, practices, knowledge, values and 
traditions of the legal elite of a legal system.29  
  
 28 As Watson points out, “[l]egal change comes about through the culture of the legal 
elite, the lawmakers, and it is above all determined by that culture”. Watson, A.: The 
Evolution of Western Private Law. Baltimore, 2001, 264. 
 29 From the viewpoint of the autopoiesis theory, G. Teubner criticizes Watson for placing 
too much emphasis on the lawyers’ professional practices as such. Teubner argues that these 
practices are not, in themselves, the motor of legal change but rather the necessary outcome 
of law’s character as a distinctive discourse concerned chiefly with producing decisions that 
define what is legal. Because what is legal is law’s essential focus as an independent 
discourse, law cannot be governed by social developments of the kind sociologists are 
concerned with. It may react to these developments but it always does so in its own 
normative terms. Thus, what Watson sees as the autonomous law development by legal elites, 
proponents of autopoiesis theory regard as the working out of law’s independent evolution as 
a highly specialized and functionally distinctive communication system. For a closer look 
see in general Luhmann, N.: Social Systems, 1995; Teubner, G.: Law as an Autopoietic System. 
Cambridge, 1993; Priban, J.–Nelken, D. (eds): Law’s New Boundaries: The Consequences 
of Legal Autopoiesis. London, 2001. On the implications of the autopoiesis theory for 
comparative law see Teubner, G.: Legal Irritants: Good Fath in British Law or How 
Unifying Law Ends U p in New Divergences. Modern Law Reriew 61 (1998) 11. 
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 The discretion factor refers to the implicit or explicit discretion that exists 
either to enforce or not enforce the law, or to press or not press one’s legal 
rights. In Watson’s words, the discretion factor is concerned with “the extent 
to which the rules permit variations, or can be evaded … or need not or will 
not be invoked”.30 He observes that some degree of discretion is an inevitable 
element in any developed legal system. This discretion may be possessed by 
individual parties, judges, the executive or actually be built into the legal rules 
themselves. By providing choice the discretion factor tends to mitigate the 
apparent undesirable requirements or consequences of legal norms, thus 
prompting an easier acceptance of these norms. However, Watson does not fail 
to note that an abuse of discretion will entail an adverse reaction. It is true that 
discretion creates choice, but the use of choice depends on certain other factors. 
It might be the case, for example, that a controversial parliamentary bill is 
passed as law after the most questionable paragraphs have been recast in such 
a way as to enable the judiciary or the executive to exercise discretion (e.g. 
open wording, general clause s or flexible criteria are used). However, this 
transfers the problem to another level of decision-making. At that level of 
micro decision-making, the principle pertaining to the equal treatment of the 
subjects of law plays a more important part than at the level of law-making, 
where the criteria of formal justice are introduced. From a comparative point 
of view, it should be stressed that a mere statement of discretion is rarely 
sufficient, as discretion is exercised according to some criteria and not at 
random. To understand how the discretion factor influences the state and develop-
ment of the law, one should identify both the factual and the evaluative criteria 
of discretion.  
 The generality factor denotes the extent to which legal rules regulate more 
than one recognizable group of people, or more than one transaction or factual 
situation. Watson points out that the greater the generality of law, the more 
difficult it is to find a rule that precisely fits the situation of each group, or 
transaction or factual situation being regulated. He adds that the greater the 
generality of a proposed change in the law, the greater the difficulty of securing 
agreement on the appropriate rule or rules, and hence the greater the difficulty 
of bringing about legal change. The generality factor interacts to a considerable 
extent with the pressure or opposition forces. If the scope of the proposed 
change in the law is too narrow, the pressure force supporting it may have little 
influence. If, on the other hand, the scope of the proposed change is too broad, 
it is likely to produce an opposition force as such a change is unlikely to satisfy 
all the groups concerned. A connection also exists between the generality factor 
  
 30 Comparative Law and Legal Change. 330.  
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and the sources of law: to carry out a legislative change a degree of generality 
is needed. In comparative studies it is useful to draw a distinction between 
abstract generality and actual generality.31 There may be norms addressed ‘to 
whom it may concern’, i.e. to anyone. For example, drug trafficking may be a 
criminal offence and prohibited to everyone. Despite the abstract character of 
the relevant norm, the prohibition it produces, in reality, concerns a relatively 
small number of people. On the other hand, there may be norms addressed to a 
particular group of people that is so large in number that the norms are practically 
general.  
 Inertia is defined by Watson as the general absence of a sustained interest 
of society and its ruling elite to struggle for the most ‘satisfactory’ rule. For 
law to be changed there must exist a sufficiently strong impulse directed through 
a pressure force operating on a source of law. This impulse must be strong 
enough to overcome the inertia. But how can inertia be explained? Watson 
notes that society’s essential stake in law is order, and to maintain order there 
cannot be a consuming interest in the precise nature of the particular rules and 
their reform. There is a normal desire for stability and society, particularly the 
dominant elite, have a generalized interest in maintaining the status quo. This 
reflects an abstract interest in stability, which is linked to the fact that many 
legal norms have no direct impact on the lives of most citizens. According to 
Watson, besides the mystique surrounding law, practical considerations may 
obstruct legal change. Legal professionals may oppose legal reforms because 
they would have to learn new rules and juristic techniques. Moreover, as every 
legal reform entails a considerable cost, priorities must be assessed with regard 
to limited resources. Perhaps the case is that anticipated long-term benefits are 
not sufficient to justify a reform if the costs are not outweighed by the short-
term benefits. Watson argues that inertia as a factor in the relationship between 
law and society is not accorded the attention it deserves. He remarks that, as a 
matter of fact, societies often tolerate much law that has no correspondence 
with what is ‘needed’ or regarded as efficient. To understand the rationale one 
must consider the phenomenon of legal inertia and the various elements of its 
composition. Legal inertia has, I think, two aspects. First, it renders a ‘static’ 
justification of law sufficient: law is justified by past behaviour and behaviour 
by norms. This kind of inertia is inherent in all legal decision-making that 
strives to maintain regularity and predictability in the practice of law. Besides 
this aspect of inertia, inertia also relates to the structure and function of law in 
  
 31 Abstract generality is a typical feature of legislation. As stated by the classical 
Roman jurist Ulpian: “iura non in singulas personas, sed generaliter constituuntur”. 
Digest 1, 3, 8. 
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society. There are two kinds of structural matters for consideration: (a) law is 
to a certain extent resistant to certain social change, and society to certain legal 
change, and (b) there is a ‘relative resistance’ to change pertaining to the time-
lag between different functionally interdependent changes.  
 Felt needs are the purposes known to, and regarded as appropriate by, a 
pressure force (not the ruling elite or society as a whole) that operates on a 
source of law. Watson recognizes that elucidating the nature of felt needs is not 
always easy. He declares that these are discoverable through an examination of 
words, deeds and effects: what the pressure force says is needed; how its 
constituent elements act both before and after the legal change is effected; and 
how the change actually impacts upon the interests of the pressure force. There 
are also needs that may be general, well-recognized and enduring in time. But 
unless these are supported by an active pressure force they are not ‘felt needs’ 
as understood by Watson, even though consideration of these ‘other needs’ is 
important for anyone interested in understanding the relationship between law 
and society.  
 The question posited is how should Watson’s nine ‘factors’ be used? He 
declares that, by relying upon these factors, one may devise models for legal 
development and the relationship between law and society. At the same time, 
by considering the interaction of these factors one can find answers to many 
perplexing questions concerning legal development. There are balances between 
the factors supporting change and the factors opposing change. According to 
Watson, the relationship between a society and its legal rules could be generally 
expressed as a mathematical equation: a legal rule will be stable when felt needs, 
weakened by the discretion factor, activating a pressure force as affected by the 
generality factor, to work on the relevant source of law, are less potent than 
inertia and opposition force combined; on the other hand, some legal change 
will occur when the force of felt needs, weakened by the discretion factor, 
activating a pressure force as affected by the generality factor, to work on a 
source of law, all as modified by the transplant bias and law-shaping lawyers, 
is greater than the force of inertia plus the opposition force. In other words, the 
precise relationship between legal norms and the society in which they operate 
can be expressed as the balance between two opposing sets of factors; the first 
inhibits change and the second supports change. A legal change occurs when 
the force of the second set of factors is greater than the force of the first set of 
factors, although the nature of the change is determined by the balance and 
relative weight of the various factors. In Watson’s model one cannot locate a 
direct reference to concepts and elements that are commonplace in modern 
analyses of society. Neither society at large nor its dominant strata are regarded 
as factors. Legal change is triggered by pressure forces, not by society as a 
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whole, or its ruling elite. As he says, the pressure force and the society, or the 
pressure force and the ruling elite, are often co-extensive. Further, in a non-
democratic political system the ruling elite operates directly on the principal 
sources of law, enjoying a kind of monopoly with respect to legal change. In 
any country, the extent to which the pressure force and the society or its ruling 
elite are the same must be determined by a specific inquiry, although one must 
recall that, even if society at large or its ruling elite operate as the pressure 
force, legal rules are not necessarily the most efficient means of using social 
power to initiate reforms.  
 Watson claims that his model is useful for elucidating certain difficult 
issues pertaining to legal development.32 But the model is not deterministic. He 
elaborates that, although existing elements in a society may determine the options 
that are known or knowable, and hence available, they do not predetermine the 
necessary outcome. In my view, this suggests that Watson’s factors can only 
furnish the basis for a method of presenting relevant aspects of legal change in a 
generally valid manner. No objections of principle could be raised against such a 
method. The objections are, rather, of a practical nature. One might argue, for 
example, that Watson’s felt needs and pressure forces do not direct enough 
attention to the fact that there are not only supporters and opponents of a 
proposed legal change. Often there is at least a degree of unanimity concerning 
the necessity for legal reform, but there are differing opinions as to the content 
of the planned legislation. In this case, the pressure forces and relevant interests 
cannot be seen as diametrically opposite. Interests can be construed as vectors 
which in concrete situations have a certain direction and strength (when compared 
to other social vectors). It is difficult to state that the law in question is a result 
of the goals of one interest group if this law is more allied to its interests 
than those of another group. This vie w excludes the immediate authority of 
conflicting background interests and statements of goals. But this does not mean 
that it is incorrect to refer to the social impact of different decision-alternatives;  
  
 32 For example, it is often said that there is a close connection between commerce and 
law, especially the law of contract, and that economic growth engenders legal change. But 
the Scots law of contract developed rapidly between the years 1633 and 1665 (it was 
during this period that the main forms of contract and the general principles of contract law 
were recognized), even though, as is well known, this period was characterized by economic 
stagnation. By contrast, in England, which was much more developed economically and 
commercially, there could scarcely be said that a general law of contract or general 
principles of contract existed before the nineteenth century. To understand this one must 
consider the interaction of the factors relevant to legal change in the relevant historical 
context. 
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and one is compelled to evaluate these alternatives, taking some axiological 
system as the starting point, even if no one can say that there exists one and only 
one consequent value-system of the legal order. Furthermore, the intentions of 
groups should not be defined in such a manner that one only considers those 
goals embodied in the historical sources. Constructed, hypothetical models are 
also needed, otherwise one may lose sight of probable motives of action which 
are not explicitly alluded to in the sources. 
 Let us now return to our earlier question: is it possible to construct a 
general theory of legal change? Watson declares that, even if an examination 
of the various factors reveals such a diversity of possibilities that a general 
theory could not be developed regarding the growth of law in the West (except 
perhaps on such an obvious, banal level), a theory should be admissible so far 
as it is accepted that it is possible to trace a pattern of development. Consider, 
for example, the phenomenon of codification. Since the eighteenth century 
codification has emerged as almost an inevitability in Civil law countries, but 
it has been a relative rarity in the Common law world. According to Watson, 
this pattern cannot be explained on the basis of unrelated facts existing in the 
different countries. Elucidating codification (why it occurred at all and in a 
particular country at a specific time and not earlier; why the code was either a 
new creation or adopted from elsewhere; and, if the latter, why the particular 
model was chosen), or its absence in certain systems, would presuppose 
consideration of the general factors at work when legal change occurs. It is 
important to note that a general theory of legal change would be inductive: if 
all situations of legal change are considered, then some general conclusions 
may be drawn. But such a theory would only be nominally general: in reality, 
it would include several different relations of events. However, there are some 
generally valid interconnections between different matters. The expression of 
these interconnections may be facilitated by ‘historical laws’, but these laws 
are not obligatory. They are only ‘topical norms’ in the form of: ‘if N exists 
then F will happen, unless…’. One should distinguish between questions of 
form and questions of content. It is possible to construct a set of forms with the 
purpose of explaining a matter. If the validity of the theory is defined in such a 
manner that it depends on the relevance of the forms, it is possible to construct 
a theory of legal change. But this is primarily a conceptual exercise: it has 
nothing or very little to say about the contents of the concepts. The bulk of the 
theory would then consist of statements concerning possible interactions between 
the conceptually arranged matters and statements concerning working hypo-
theses on these relationships of interaction.  
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Conclusion 
 
The uses of comparative law may be manifold, but its connection with legal 
theory is also important. Propositions of legal theory can be tested on the 
grounds of comparative material, for there exists a dialectical relationship 
between theory and practice that extends beyond the narrow limits of a single 
legal order–indeed, most legal theorists seem to assume a deductive universality 
of analysis. This process involves consideration of juristic forms that are not 
incidental or particular to the relevant case: they stem from the history of legal 
doctrines and ideas. We may assert that whether we proceed from forms or 
from contents, the choices of subjects are not purely empiric al; axiological 
and teleological choices must be considered and examined together with the 
doctrinal history of legal concepts and their systematical treatment. We can 
thus declare that comparative law proceeds from the following two assumptions: 
(a) law is not only a manifestation of free will but is also socially established; 
one cannot compare legal regulations on a purely formal basis; (b) law stems 
from social relations, but it cannot be entirely reduced to them; otherwise, one 
should not compare law at all but only the basic factors the law expresses. The 
existence of certain similar social relationships does not constitute a sufficient 
condition for comparison–comparative law is not merely comparative sociology. 
A conceptual framework is also needed. If the reductionistic standpoint is 
rejected, one is justified in seeking the development of general idealistic 
theories of legal change. It is at least reasonable to hope that such theories will 
enhance insights into the nature and development of law–insights that cannot 
be acquired in any other way. 
